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I. FRANK PREMISES, FIRST PRINCIPLES
Isn't it obvious?
The Constitution prescribes an explicitly political process for
the nomination, confirmation, and appointment of US Supreme
Court justices and lower federal court judges. The president has
the exclusive power of nomination and may exercise that power
on the basis of any criteria he or she sees fit. The Senate has the
power to provide its "advice" and-if it wishes-its "consent" to
such a nomination. The Senate, too, may exercise its advising
and consenting (or nonconsenting) power on the basis of whatever
criteria and in whatever manner senators think appropriate. 2
Ultimately, the two sets of political actors must come to an
agreement: the president can make a judicial appointment only
with the Senate's consent.
The political-constitutional judicial appointment process is
inevitably, and necessarily, an occasion of political constitutional
interpretation. The nomination and consent powers are occasions
for the exercise by the president and the Senate of their respective
independent prerogatives of constitutional interpretation, and
rightfully can be used to advance those political actors' respective
t Distinguished University Chair and Professor at the University of St. Thomas
School of Law.
1 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2.
2 The appointment process is set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2. For an
insightful analysis of the constitutional meaning of "Advice and Consent," see generally
Adam J. White, Toward the Framers' Understanding of "Advice and Consent": A Historical
and Textual Inquiry, 29 Harv J L & Pub Pol 103 (2005).
One qualification to the sweeping formulation in the text: Article VI of the
Constitution forbids the imposition of a "religious Test" for any federal office. US Const
Art VI, cl 3. That prohibition forbids the president from making a person's religion (or lack
of one) or specific religious beliefs a criterion for nomination. The Senate is similarly
forbidden from using such a criterion in deciding whether to grant or withhold its consent
to an appointment. The fact that this constitutional restriction might not be judicially
enforceable does not make it any less binding on the president and the Senate. See Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Is Lloyd Bentsen Unconstitutional?, 46 Stan L Rev 907, 916 (1994).
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understandings of the proper constitutional exercise of the
judicial power.
This political process is a vital-and deliberate-
constitutional "check" on the judiciary. It exists for eminently
practical reasons: Supreme Court justices exercise important,
often hugely consequential, government power. Whether or not
one believes in "judicial supremacy" over the Constitution (I do
not 3 ), the federal judicial power to interpret and apply the
Constitution and other governing law to judicially decide cases
and controversies within courts' assigned jurisdiction is an
enormously influential governmental power within our
constitutional system. Once a justice or judge is appointed, the
exercise of that power becomes, for the most part, unchecked and
virtually uncheckable by the political branches.4 Once appointed,
a federal judge serves for life and exercises judicial power in-
dependently and largely immune from political control. In prac-
tical terms, therefore, the judicial appointments process is the
last clear chance for the other branches to check judicial power.
The Framers of the Constitution designed the federal judicial
selection process so as to provide such a check, and intended that
it so operate.5
3 See, for example, Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lincoln and Judicial Authority, 83
Notre Dame L Rev 1227, 1298-1301 (2008) (arguing that "the lost lesson of Lincoln . . . is
the stunning wrongness of the claim of complete judicial supremacy in constitutional
interpretation"); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 Mich L
Rev 2706, 2709 (2003) ("The logic ofMarbury implies not, as it is so widely assumed today,
judicial supremacy, but constitutional supremacy-the supremacy of the document itself
over misapplications of its dictates by any and all subordinate agencies created by it.");
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the
Law Is, 83 Georgetown L J 217, 292-320 (1994) (making the textual, structural,
theoretical, historical, and practical case for fully coequal, coordinate powers of
constitutional interpretation by all three branches of the national government, and
against claims ofjudicial supremacy).
4 There are several other constitutionally proper means by which the political
branches of the national government can check the abuse or misuse of judicial power,
which I discuss in other recent work. But each of these other means suffers from practical
or political defects, or constitutional limitations, not shared with checks at the
appointments stage. See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Checking the Court, 10 NYU
J L & Liberty 18 (2016).
5 Federalist 76 and 77 make this plain. See Charles L. Black Jr, A Note on Senatorial
Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 Yale L J 657, 661-62 (1970) (quoting
Federalist 76 and 77 to argue for the propriety of the Senate acting as a restraining check
on presidential judicial appointments and the propriety of the Senate considering
anything that the president might consider in making a nomination). See also Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Book Review, Straightening Out The Confirmation Mess, 105 Yale L J
549, 562-70 (1995) (arguing that "[t]he appointments process is part of the Framers'
independence-plus-mutual-checking arrangement").
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Simply put: Supreme Court justices, once nominated, con-
firmed, and appointed, wield immensely important, independent,
and essentially unchecked government power.
Judicial ideology matters greatly to the exercise of that
power. Obviously. It matters, for example, whether a judge be-
lieves that the Constitution is to be interpreted and applied in
accordance with its original meaning or that (quite the reverse)
judges possess the power to render decisions based on new
meanings they derive from personal beliefs, political principles,
pragmatic considerations, or something else. It likewise mat-
ters-obviously-what a judge's substantive views are concerning
the meanings of specific provisions of the Constitution. The
exercise of the federal judicial power involves great and important
considerations of constitutional meaning, and the way a judge
would exercise such power-and whether such a method or
manner is faithful to the Constitution or not-is itself a
constitutional question of great importance.
Considerations of judicial ideology (or "philosophy" or
"methodology") therefore should be absolutely central to the
nomination and consent decisions. The political branches are
bound by their oaths to support the Constitution in the exercise
of their constitutional powers, including their powers with respect
to judicial appointments. The president swears a specific,
constitutionally prescribed oath to "preserve, protect and defend
the Constitution." 6 Senators swear the oath to support the
Constitution mandated by Article VI for all legislative, executive,
and judicial officers. 7 It follows, fairly naturally, that in the
exercise of their respective powers with respect to nomination,
advice and consent, and appointment of Supreme Court justices,
the president and the Senate each possess a constitutional duty
to act in good faith to support the Constitution by appointing and
confirming (or by declining to appoint or confirm) persons they
believe will exercise the judicial power faithfully in accordance
with the Constitution. And in making this evaluation, both the
president and the Senate properly may exercise independent
constitutional judgment concerning how the Constitution is
properly to be interpreted and applied.
It follows, I submit, that presidents and senators as a matter
of constitutional power may-and as a matter of constitutional
duty must-take considerations of judicial philosophy into full
6 US Const Art II, § 1, cl 8. See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of
Necessity, 79 Notre Dame L Rev 1257, 1260-63 (2004).
7 US Const Art VI, cl 3.
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and fair account in exercising their constitutional responsibilities
with respect to federal judicial appointments.
II. EVALUATING NOMINEES: THE CASE FOR LITMUS TESTS
How is that responsibility best exercised? There is probably
a range of reasonable judgment as to the precise method presi-
dents and senators should employ to ascertain whether a pro-
spective judicial appointee is likely to interpret and apply the
Constitution and other governing law faithfully, in the president's
or senator's judgment. But I submit that one set of positions falls
outside that range: complete deference to any views or
interpretive philosophy a nominee might hold, or complete un-
willingness to inquire into such views, on the ground that
postconfirmation "judicial independence" renders such inquiries
improper.
That view is constitutionally indefensible. The constitutional
independence of federal judges consists of life tenure and salary
guarantees and autonomy in the actual exercise of the judicial
function.8 But that's it. The (limited) independence of judges, once
appointed, does not remotely imply immunity from the up-front
check of substantive ideological review at the appointments stage.
So to assert would be to deny the explicitly political process for
judicial appointments created by the Constitution.
To be sure, it might compromise the postappointment
decisional independence of judges for presidents or senators to
leverage the appointment power forward to exact commitments as
to future decisions by a judge. That would be improper. But in
exactly the same way, it would compromise the preappointment
constitutional prerogatives of the political branches to leverage
judicial independence "backwards" (as it were) so as to forbid
inquiry into substantive views. Presidents and senators properly
8 See US Const Art III, § 1. This of course does not mean that Congress and the
president are forbidden from using their legislative and executive powers to urge courts to
adopt positions or general interpretive approaches that the political branches of
government think correct. If it did, that would forbid the executive from advancing
positions in litigation in which it is involved. It would also forbid Congress from enacting
statutes specifying rules of governing federal law. Both results would be absurd. Nor does
autonomy of judicial decision mean that judicial decisions bind the political branches in
the independent exercise of their constitutional powers. See Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L J
at 274-75, 283-84 (cited in note 3). Nor, finally, does it preclude the use of the
impeachment power if Congress judges the actions of judges to constitute a high crime or
misdemeanor. See Paulsen, 101 Mich L Rev at 2729-30 (cited in note 3). It merely means
that the exercise of the judicial power by the judicial branch ultimately must remain
within the control of the judicial branch, even if such an exercise ofjudicial power remains
subject to the external checking powers of the other branches.
3120161
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may ask whatever they want. Judicial candidates may answer-
and can do so constitutionally and ethically without
compromising judicial independence-so long as they do not lit-
erally bind themselves in their (possible) future exercise of judi-
cial power.9
Subject to this one essentially formal limitation, presidents
and senators can and should put direct substantive "litmus test"
questions to judicial candidates and demand answers. Indeed, as
I first wrote more than twenty years ago,10 the perfect such ques-
tion-the one that yields the maximum possible information
about judicial philosophy, sense of judicial role, constitutional
interpretive methodology, and public moral courage-is to ask
about a nominee's views of Roe v Wade." What is the meaning of
"person" under the Fourteenth Amendment (that is, does it in-
clude the unborn?) and what methodology would one use to de-
termine the answer? May courts properly create new constitution-
al rights (whether in the name of "substantive due process" or
under some other provision) with only the most tenuous or
abstract basis in supposedly "open-ended" constitutional texts?
What is the role of courts versus legislatures in this regard? May
courts engage in the making of social policy in the name of the
Constitution? What is the legal morality of the Roe decision? If a
prior case has discovered (or invented) non-textually justified
rights, does the idea of judicial stare decisis entrench such
understandings, "whether or not mistaken"?12 Answers to this
packet of questions reveal much-nearly everything one would
need to know-about a Supreme Court nominee's judicial
ideology, and how he or she would exercise judicial power. A
president or a senator could, with entire propriety, support or
9 I have drawn this line in other writing. See Paulsen, 105 Yale L J at 570-75 (cited
in note 5). Even this before-and-after line may be subject to a qualification: a senator may
certainly take the position that he or she will consider a judge's departure from a stated
correct standard in the exercise of judicial power as a violation of the judge's oath,
providing grounds for a senator's vote in favor of conviction in an impeachment trial. See
Paulsen, 10 NYU J L & Liberty at 82-83 (discussing the propriety of impeachment for
believed abuse of judicial power) (cited in note 4). See also Federalist 81 (Hamilton), in
The Federalist 541 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed) (contemplating impeachment as
a check on abuse of judicial power).
10 Paulsen, 105 Yale L J at 568 (cited in note 5).
11 410 US 113 (1973).
12 The "whether or not mistaken" formulation comes from the Court's decision in
Planned Parenthood v Casey, 505 US 833, 857 (1992).
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oppose a potential candidate on the basis of his or her answers to
this line of questions-or refusal to answer them. 13
III. THE 2016 ELECTION
It is obvious to the point of being a clich6: elections matter to
the composition and direction of the Supreme Court. The 2016
election is certainly no exception. The sudden death of the
supremely great Justice Antonin Scalia in February 2016 frames
the question of judicial philosophy and the future direction of the
Court as an election issue, in an unusually direct, immediate, and
dramatic fashion. Election year vacancies and appointments are
not unprecedented, but they are rare. Even rarer is the case in
which an election year vacancy arises when one party holds the
presidency (as a lame duck) and the other possesses the majority
in the Senate.14
Such circumstances do not alter the existence of the political
branches' respective constitutional powers. But they may well
affect the conditions and dynamics of their exercise. President
Barack Obama certainly possesses the constitutional power to
nominate a successor to Scalia, and he has done so. 15 The Senate
certainly possesses the constitutional power to decline to consent
to such an appointment, and may do so by declining to even con-
sider a nomination. Each branch has its prerogative; each
properly may press its views as to the proper understanding of
the Constitution and of the judicial role with the powers at its
disposal. Obama might wish to appoint a liberal jurist committed
to a "living constitutionalism" activist view of the judicial role,
and to do so before his presidency ends. The Senate might
strongly prefer to honor Scalia's legacy by refusing to confirm
anyone other than a principled constitutional "originalist" in the
Scalia mode. Both sides are plainly within their rights. 16
13 The Court's decision in Obergefell v Hodges, 135 S Ct 2584 (2015), creating a right
to same-sex marriage, presents many similar issues and might similarly function as a
useful litmus test ofjudicial philosophy and constitutional ideology.
14 Jonathan H. Adler, On Election Year Supreme Court Vacancies (Wash Post, Feb
13, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/55WZ-JEQZ.
15 Remarks by the President Announcing Judge Merrick Garland as His Nominee to
the Supreme Court (White House, Mar 16, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/D8LE-V6S5.
16 There is no constitutional obligation of the Senate to act affirmatively on a
proposed appointment and there is no constitutional necessity that the Court operate with
nine justices. The Constitution does not prescribe the number of justices; the statutory
number has varied considerably over the years and included even-numbered
arrangements (including originally six, under the first Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat 73);
and the Court has frequently functioned with less than the full statutory complement of
judges. Indeed, a plausible case can be made that an eight-member Court serves important
3320161
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It is neither improper nor surprising that national elections
should decide, in whole or in part, large and small questions of
constitutional power or meaning. Arguably, elections did so in
enormously consequential ways in 1800 (repudiating the position
of the Adams administration and the federal judiciary on the
question of the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition acts),17
in 1832 (vindicating the constitutional position of President
Andrew Jackson, against that of the Supreme Court, on the
constitutionality of a national bank),18 and in 1860 (repudiating
the position of the Supreme Court and the South on Dred Scott v
Sandford 19 and the supposed constitutional right to extend
slavery into national territories, and electing a president whose
public position was opposed to the validity, extension, or binding
political force of the Court's decision). 20 Many other elections have
presented less enormous constitutional questions but influenced,
directly or indirectly, the ultimate resolution of certain
constitutional issues. Voters, as individuals, possess less
constitutional interpretive power than presidents or senators, but
in the aggregate possess more such power than any branch of
national government. Voters certainly have the right to exercise
the constitutional interpretive power they have by virtue of their
votes. Elections are often acts of constitutional interpretation,
and properly so.
The 2016 election presents substantial questions of
constitutional meaning-including how the appointment and
confirmation power should be exercised, the broader issue of the
future composition of the Supreme Court, and (indirectly) the
question of the propriety or impropriety of the Court's exercise of
its powers of constitutional interpretation in highly controversial
recent cases. If it is obvious (as I have argued above it is) that
political actors properly may consider constitutional ideology in
the exercise of their own constitutional powers with respect to
judicial appointments, it should be equally obvious that voters
functions of judicial restraint (requiring a larger pro rata majority consensus, of 5-3, for
decisions in closely contested matters). See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Eight Is Enough
(Justices That Is): Let the Court Unpack Itself (National Review Online, June 23, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/6K9Z-GSUC.
17 See Michael Stokes Paulsen and Luke Paulsen, The Constitution: An Introduction
133-137 (Basic Books 2015).
18 See id at 127.
19 60 US (19 How) 393 (1857).
20 See Paulsen and Paulsen, The Constitution: An Introduction at 162-69 (cited in
note 17). See also generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional
Interpretation, 71 U Chi L Rev 691 (2004) (discussing the significance of the election of
Lincoln and the Civil War as events of constitutional interpretation).
34 [83:28
7
Paulsen: The Constitutional Propriety of Ideological Litmus Tests for Judi
Published by Chicago Unbound, 2017
2016] Ideological "Litmus Tests" 35
may consider constitutional ideology in their exercise of the
constitutional power of election of such political actors.
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